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We explore the role of corporate insiders vs. ﬁrms as traders of last resort. We develop a
simple model of insider trading in which insiders provide price support, as well as liquidity, in
security markets. Consistent with the model predictions we ﬁnd that in the US markets insiders’
trading activities have a clear impact on return distributions. Furthermore, we provide empirical
evidence on insiders transactions and ﬁrm transactions aﬀecting returns in a diﬀerent manner.
In particular, while insiders’ transactions (both purchases and sales) have a strong impact on
skewness in the short run and to a lesser extent in short run volatility, company repurchases only
have a clear impact on volatility, both in the short and the long run. We provide explanations
for this asymmetry.
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11 Introduction
Liquidity shocks can drive asset prices away from fundamental values. Corporate insiders are
in a privileged position to asses the severity of the deviations. In the presence of large enough
deviations, insiders can take two type of actions: execute trades on their own account (insider
trading) or on the company’s account (through buy back programs or seasonal equity oﬀerings).
Figure 1 provides some preliminary evidence in favor of these two hypothesis. The ﬁgures display
insiders and corporate trading activity around large returns. The two ﬁgures in the left hand side
clearly show that insiders purchases and sales pick right after large negative and positive returns,
respectively. A similar phenomena, but with some delay, is also observed in the case of seasonal
equity oﬀerings and stock repurchases.
In a very recent paper, Hong et al. (2005) study the case of stock repurchases and argue that
companies act as traders of last resort and liquidity providers. In this paper we focus on insiders
transactions and argue that insiders play a similar but distinct role. In particular, their trades aﬀect
both the volatility and the skewness of asset returns and the impact has a shorter life span than
those generated by ﬁrms’ trades. Furthermore, the impact on volatility is weaker and the impact
on skewness stronger for insiders transactions versus ﬁrms’ transactions. These results suggests
that either corporate managers specialize on a diﬀerent type of mispricing when trading on their
own account versus the company’s account or that the market interprets both type of interventions
diﬀerently. In the former case we could think of managers with a preference for positions on their
own account in the presence of mispricings that revert fast. This speed of adjustment may obey to
exogenous reasons (the nature of the shock itself) or may be endogenous as managers may be able to
use their position to disclose ﬁgures in the income statement that speeds the revelation of the mis-
valuation. Regarding the interpretation of each type of traders’ trades by market participants, it is
important to notice that while ﬁrms transactions are preannounced (i.e., they are not anonymous),
insiders’ trades are only disclosed after they take place1. This means the, unlike ﬁrms, insiders
may face a strong adverse selection problem. All these considerations call for the need to develop a
full theory that analyzes the tradeoﬀs involved in trading on the ﬁrm’s vs the manager’s account,
1The SEC requires insiders’ trading to be reported before the end of the second business day following the day of
the transaction. Prior to August 29, 2002, reporting requirements were lighter. In particular, reports were required
to be ﬁlled by the 10th of the month following the transaction.
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Figure 1: Insider and ﬁrm trading around large price movements of individual stocks. This graph show
insider sales and seasoned equity oﬀerings around monthly returns smaller than -20%, and insider purchases
and ﬁrm repurchases around monthly returns larger than 20%. The abscissa axis displays event time in
months. The graphs show the time series average of the cross-sectional average by year.
3in the presence of liquidity shocks, when moral hazard and adverse selection considerations are in
place. This, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper.
The idea of insiders as traders of last resort may sound suspicious at ﬁrst sight. First, there
are the legal restrictions on insider trading activities. On this front we must realize that only
insider trading in possession of material nonpublic information is illegal. Transactions by insiders
as traders of last resort are not prohibited in general. An example of such legal insider trades is
given by Seyhun (1998):
...Insiders can clearly trade on the basis of their understanding and interpretation
of public information outside the moratorium periods. For instance, assume that the
stock price of the ﬁrm goes down sharply. The decline of stock price is, after all, public
information. Now suppose that insiders do not know anything about their ﬁrm that
would justify such a price decline. Insiders in this case can comfortably buy stock of
their ﬁrm (and support the market) without worrying about insider-trading regulations.
Second, we have witnessed by now more that twenty years of research, both theoretical and
empirical, in market microstructure emphasizing somehow the opposite to what we claim here,
namely, that insider trading generates volatility and reduces liquidity. Indeed we should expect
that the larger the presence of informed traders, the larger the adverse selection in the market
and consequently the larger the spreads and the lower the liquidity. This insight has even been
documented empirically. For instance, Chung and Charoenwong (1998) show that bid-ask spreads
are wider for stocks in which insiders are more active. In our view this is perfectly consistent with
our hypothesis. Notice ﬁrst that insider trading must be publicized. It is indeed the publicity of
these trades what resolves uncertainty and information asymmetries in asset markets that results
in smaller adverse selection driven spreads and restored liquidity levels.
A third concern is the size of trading by insiders. One may argue that while the size of, say, a
company buyback program is big enough to provide actual counterpart to sellers, the typical size of
insider purchases is too small for that purpose. While the argument is correct, it ignores what for
us is critical: the informational content of the trade per se. Insiders trades can be small in terms
of share volume, but quite big in terms of information revelation.
4A ﬁnal concern is that insiders may be mainly trading for reasons other that proﬁting from
perceived mispricing, in which case the impact of their trades on returns should be negligible. For
instance, portfolio rebalancing (diversiﬁcation) and keeping a controlling stake are two clear motives
for insider trading. In a classic paper, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) reached the conclusion that while
insider purchases are driven by information, “insider selling that is motivated by private information
is dominated by portfolio rebalancing for diversiﬁcation purposes”. There is, however, more recent
evidence linking insider sales to crashes. Mar´ ın and Olivier (2006) show robust evidence of a path
of insider’s high selling activity in the far past and low selling activity in the near past preceding
large price drops. The current state of knowledge, hence, is that the information component in
both insider sales and purchases is non negligible2.
Although this view of insiders as traders of last resort we propose in this paper is new there is
already some encouraging evidence. For instance, Seyhun (1990) shows that insiders bought large
amounts of shares after the October 1987 crash. Indeed, our Figure 1 provides a stronger picture
in this direction: not only insiders purchases pick after big negative returns, but also insiders
sales after large positive returns. Mar´ ın and Olivier (2006) also provide evidence supportive of our
hypothesis. In particular, they ﬁnd that large drops in the price of a particular stock are more
likely after a period of low insider trading volume (i.e. large negative returns happen in the absence
of price support by insiders). Insiders also seem to trade in advance of the ﬁrm’s trades. Lee et al.
(1992) found that insiders buy or decrease their sales prior to ﬁxed price repurchase announcements
by their ﬁrms; similarly, Jenter (2005) reports that, in years in which a ﬁrm issues new equity, its
insiders sell between $1.4 and $1.5 million more equity.
The ﬁrst goal of this paper is to develop a model of insider trading where insiders act as
traders of last resort. The model is simple but rich enough to provide testable implication on the
impact of insider trading on return distributions. We work out a there period extension of the
Grossman-Stiglitz model (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) where insiders transactions are disclosed
2It is also important emphasizing here that non informational considerations are also relevant in the case of share
repurchases. Many companies running out of good investment opportunities have often initiated general payout
programs including stock repurchases. In this case the repurchases are not the result of perceived misvaluations.
They may be associated to low future return volatility, but the latter is the result of the lack of good risky project
rather than the repurchases themselves. Still is seems that misvaluation is the dominating factor. For instance, using
survey data Brav et al. and Graham and Harvey conclude that most managers consider misvaluation important or
very important when deciding whether to issue new stock or buy it back.
5the period after they take place. We also introduce an exogenous trading cost for transactions done
by insiders. The ﬁrst departure is justiﬁed on institutional grounds as insiders in actual markets
must report their trades before the second business day following the day of the transaction. The
second departure makes insiders interventions only worthwhile when the mispricing is large enough.
There are several reasons for insiders not to intervene when the mispricing is small. On the one
hand, insiders transactions are scrutinized by the SEC, which means that insiders always face
a positive probability of being prosecuted. On the other hand, typically insiders’ portfolios are
overweighted on their own stock. This means insiders will only ﬁnd worthwhile to increase their
holdings when the mispricing is large enough to compensate their extra poor diversiﬁcation. All
these considerations point at a cost of trading that, unlike other type of investors, insiders bear.
Furthermore, the argument about diversiﬁcation suggests this cost is larger for insiders purchases
than for insiders sales3. Our model provides several testable implications. We focus on those related
to the role of insiders as price supporters. The ﬁrst prediction of the model is that in the absence of
a strong adverse selection problem the short term volatility of the risky asset return is decreasing
in both insiders sales and purchases. The second prediction is that the skewness of the risky asset
return is increasing on insiders purchases and decreasing on insiders sales. All these predictions are
corroborated in the empirical part of the paper.
As previously stated, very recently Hong et al. (2005) have found that ﬁrms might act as traders
of last resort. Those ﬁrms that are less ﬁnancially constrained can repurchase their own stock when
the stock price is signiﬁcantly lower than its fundamental value. They ﬁnd evidence of lower short
term return variance relative to long term return variance, and larger skewness in the distribution
of returns, for those less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, which are those more capable of repurchasing
their own shares4. However, ﬁrms don’t have the same ability to become sellers of last resort when
their equity becomes overvalued; this is because seasoned equity oﬀerings are more costly and
require more time to execute than share repurchases. The latter are much more frequent than the
former, Fama and French (2005) estimate that the fraction of ﬁrms with seasoned equity oﬀerings in
a given year during the period 1983–1992 was 5.7%, and 6.3% for the period 1993–2002; conversely,
3In some cases, the cost for insider sales might be larger than the cost of insider purchases: for instance, during
lockup periods or when short selling constraints are binding, the cost for insider sales can be inﬁnite.
4Hong et al.’s results on skewness are weaker than those on short term variance, more speciﬁcally, they do not
ﬁnd signiﬁcant coeﬃcients when the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial constrainedness is measured using the Kaplan-Zingales index.
6according to Grullon and Michaely (2002), 84.2% of the ﬁrms that initiated a cash distribution to
their shareholders in 2000, also initiated a buyback program. Although it is easier for a ﬁrm to
repurchase shares than issue new ones, there is evidence that ﬁrms also do the latter when they
perceive that their shares are overpriced. In the survey of Brav et al. (2005), 86.4% of the surveyed
ﬁnancial executives consider that it is important or very important whether their stock is a good
investment relative to its true value when taking a stock repurchase decision; on the other hand,
in another survey (Graham and Harvey (2001)) 66.94% of the surveyed considered important or
very important the amount by which their stock was overvalued or undervalued when considering
issuing common stock.
We have then two clear candidates for traders of last resort: ﬁrms and insiders. It is not obvious
however if their actions are complementary or substitutes. This motivates our second main goal in
this paper which consist on empirically asses the relevance and nature of each type of trading in
price supporting and liquidity provision.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we develop a theoretical framework
of insider trading in the presence of liquidity shocks. In Section 3 we present the empirical study
that conﬁrms the model predictions regarding insider trading and compare these ﬁnding to those
associated with share repurchases. The ﬁnal Section 4 is dedicated to some concluding remarks
and the proposal of new lines for future research.
2 The model
Let us consider an economy with three dates, t = 1, 2, and 3, and two assets. The ﬁrst is a risk
free asset that pays a gross rate of return of 1 each period. The second asset pays an uncertain
dividend at t = 3, d3, where:
d3 = s + ε.
This risky asset, to which we refer as the stock, is held by long term investors who want to keep it
until it pays its dividend. However, at t = 1, some of these investors have to trade an exogenous
and random amount of shares that, aggregated, equals to x. With Pt we denote the price of one
share of stock at date t, for t = 1, 2, and3.
7Apart from these long term investors, in the economy there are also two other types of agents,
informed and uninformed traders. Informed traders have an informational advantage as they ob-
serve the dividend related information, s, before the market opens for trade at t = 1. We will refer
to the informed traders as the informed or the insiders and use the index I for the variables that
refer to them. In the same way, we will refer to the uninformed traders as the uninformed and
use the index U for them. Both type of traders display CARA utility on their terminal wealth
with a risk aversion coeﬃcient equal to ri, for i = I andU. There is a continuum of informed and
uninformed traders with masses equal to λ and 1 − λ respectively. We will denote the shares held
by the traders at each instant as xi,t for i = I andU and t = 1, 2, and3. Note that, in this economy,
the market clearing condition can be expressed as
λxI,t + (1 − λ)xU,t = −x, for t = 1and2.
Both traders have rational expectations and choose their optimal portfolio conditional on the in-
formation that they have at each point in time. We assume that the trade done by insiders at t = 1
is made public before the market opens for trade at t = 2. Denoting by Ii,t the information set of
a trader of type i at t and given that informed traders are not endowed with securities before the
market opens at t = 1, we have:
II,1 = {s, P1},IU,1 = {P1},IU,2 = {P1, P2, xI,1}.
Furthermore, we assume that the informed cannot trade at t = 2, thus xI,2 = xI,1 and that





k+ xI,1 if xI,1 > 0,
−k− xI,1 if xI,1 < 0.
This trading cost will play an important role in our analysis as it is the parameter that controls
for the capacity of insiders to act when a liquidity shock occurs. The larger the k0s are, the less
active insiders will be in the market place. For instance, a very large k+ (k−) will severely restrict
8insiders purchases (sales) and consequently will reduce the role of insiders supporting prices when a
negative (positive) shock occurs. In sections 2.1 and 2.2 we perform several comparative exercises
on the k0s which constitute the basis for our empirical analysis in section 3.
In ﬁgure 2 we summarize the timing of events in the present model.
t = 1 t = 3 t = 2
Liquidity shock x.
Informed learn s.
Both agents trade, and 
uninformed learn from prices. 










Figure 2: Timing of events.























































2.1 Equilibrium and comparative statics
We solve for the equilibrium prices and holdings by backward induction. All the proofs can be
found in the Appendix.
2.1.1 Equilibrium at t = 2
Note ﬁrst that at the ﬁnal date, t = 3, all uncertainty is resolved. Agents consume their ﬁnal wealth
and there is no trade. Since the stock pays the certain dividend d3 in this date, the price is given
by:
P3 = x + ε.
9At date t = 2 uninformed traders learn the trades done by insiders in the previous round of trade.
Since the informed traders only trade once, we can get a closed form solution for their optimal
demand at t = 1. The following lemma establishes the desired result.
Lemma 1 The optimal demand of an informed trader at t = 1 is given by
xI,1 =

     
     
s−P1+k−
rI σ2
ε if s < P1 − k−,
0 if P1 − k− ≤ s ≤ P1 + k+,
s−P1−k+
rI σ2
ε if s > P1 + k+.
Due to the existence of (possibly asymmetric) trading costs there are three possible regions
associated to the three possible actions the insider can take: purchases of shares, sales of shares
and no trade. These transactions contain information which is relevant for uninformed traders at
date t = 2. In particular, when the insider is active in the market at t = 1, the uninformed will
fully learn the size of the asset payoﬀ related information, s, and the liquidity shock, x, at t = 2.
When the informed does not trade at t = 1 the uninformed traders update their beliefs but do not
reach full knowledge at t = 2. The following proposition characterizes an equilibrium at t = 2.
Proposition 2 An equilibrium at t = 2 is given by the holdings
xI,2 =

     
     
s−P1+k−
rI σ2
ε if s < P1 − k−,
0 if P1 − k− ≤ s ≤ P1 + k+,
s−P1−k+
rI σ2
ε if s > P1 + k+
xU,2 =

     
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if s > P1 + k+;
(2.1)
where φ and Φ are the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function of a
standard normal random variable.
Since the informed traders cannot trade at t = 2 their holdings are the same as in period t = 1.
This means that the uninformed do not trade either at t = 2. The price however is very diﬀerent
depending on whether the informed bought, sold or did not trade at t = 1. In the regions associated
to past insider activity prices reﬂect the new information the uninformed traders have learned and
the risk premium associated to their previous holdings. In the region corresponding to lack of
previous activity by insiders the price is less informative5.
2.1.2 Equilibrium at t = 1
Note that the equilibrium price 2.1 in Proposition 2 is not even a piecewise linear function of the
liquidity shock x. This precludes us from ﬁnding a closed form solution for the equilibrium at t = 1.
We have no other choice than to solve solve numerically for the equilibrium. In the Appendix we
describe the numerical methodology used.
In order to get a clear picture of the economic forces behind the equilibrium, we examine now
the impact of a liquidity shock on the equilibrium price at t = 1. In ﬁgure 3 we plot P1 as a function
of x on the domain of 3 standard deviations from the mean of x. In each of the four panels, we
perform some comparative statics varying one parameter at a time. In the upper left panel we
examine the impact of the trading costs the informed traders face, keeping k− = k+, on P1. There
are two opposing forces on the impact of trading costs on the variance of the price. On the one
5In this region there is a price indeterminacy. In particular there are equilibria in which the price may depend on
s. These equilibria are unreasonable in the sense that they are not measurable with respect to any of the traders’
equilibrium demands. We rule out this type of bubbly equilibrium in this paper. For further details on this type
of equilibria that arises when informed traders face trading constraints see Mar´ ın and Olivier (2006) and Mar´ ın and
Olivier (2000).
11hand, the larger the trading costs, the less active insiders will be in the market place and hence
the smaller their capacity to provide price support. Liquidity shocks have a larger impact on prices
what results on a larger slope of the P1 function. This eﬀect will imply an increase on the variance
of the price as we will corroborate in the next section. On the other hand, the larger the trading
cost, the lower the averse selection in the market (as insiders activity is decreased), and the lower
the slope of P1. This eﬀect will result on a decrease of the price volatility. From the graph, we see
that both eﬀects are present, but the liquidity eﬀect dominates for small trading costs while the
adverse selection eﬀect dominates for large trading costs. In 2.2 we elaborate on the way in which
these to eﬀects aﬀect the variance of the price.
In the upper right plot in ﬁgure 3 we keep ﬁxed k+ = 0.05 and plot P1 for diﬀerent values of
k−. We observe that, whenever k− 6= k+, the impact of liquidity shocks becomes asymmetric and
depends on the sign of x. The larger is the cost of selling stocks by the insider, k−, the larger the
impact of a positive liquidity shock on the price compared to a negative liquidity shock of the same
magnitude in absolute value. As we will show in the next section, this implies that the larger is k−
the largest is the skewness of P1.
In the two bottom panels of ﬁgure 3, we perform some comparative statics for σ2
ε and σ2
s. The
graphs show that the larger is the non predictable part of the dividend, σ2
ε, the larger the impact of
the liquidity shocks in P1. Similarly, the larger the volatility of the informed traders’ private signal
s (or, in other words, the larger the asymmetries of information) the larger the averse selection in
the market and, as a consequence, the larger the impact of x on P1.
2.2 Eﬀects of trading costs on the price distribution
Our model delivers testable implications regarding the distribution of short term stock returns.
Note ﬁrst, that the variance and skewness of P1 and P2 coincides with the variance and skewness
of dollar returns from t = 0 (before trading at t = 1) to t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. In ﬁgure 4
we plot the variance and skewness of P1 and P2 as a function of the trading costs informed traders
face. In the plots that display the variance we keep k− = k+ while in the plots that display the
skewness we ﬁx k+ = 0.05 and we graph the eﬀect of moving k−.
As argued in the previous section there are two opposing eﬀects in the way in which trading























































































Figure 3: Equilibrium price P1 as a function of the liquidity shock, x. The graphs show variations of the base
case parametrization that is σ2
x = 1, σ2
s = 0.01, σ2
ε = 0.04, rI = 1, rU = 2, λ = 0.1, and k− = k+ = 0.1.
The informed’s signal s is ﬁxed to be 0. The ﬁrst graph, starting at the top left, displays P1 as a function
of x for diﬀerent informed’s trading costs, keeping k− = k+. In the second graph, we have ﬁxed k+ = 0.05
and we plot P1 for diﬀerent values of k−. At the ﬁrst graph of the second row, we vary σ2
ε, while in the last
graph we vary σ2
s.
13costs aﬀect prices. These two eﬀects are also present on the way in which trading costs aﬀect the
variance of the prices. On one hand, the larger the trading costs, the less liquidity will provided
by insiders, increasing the impact of liquidity shocks on the price. This eﬀect increases the price
volatility. On the other hand, the larger the trading cost, the lower the averse selection in the
market, and the lower the variance of prices. The two top graphs in ﬁgure 4 show that for small
trading costs the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, while for large trading costs the second eﬀect dominates.
With the parametrization σ2
x = 1, σ2
s = 0.01, σ2
ε = 0.01, rI = 2, rU = 1, and λ = 0.1, the cutting
point happens at a trading cost around 7%.
Figure 4 also shows that, for a reasonable set of parameters, an increase in the cost of selling
shares by the informed traders, increases the price skewness. Indeed, when the insiders face a large
cost for sales and a positive liquidity shock (x > 0) happens, they cannot sell stocks and provide
liquidity. In the absence of this price support this positive demand shocks generates a increase in
the price that results in larger skewness in the price. By symmetry, the skewness of the prices is
decreasing in the cost of purchases that informed traders face.
These exercises make clear the way in which trading costs aﬀect the variance and the skewness
of the dollar return of the risky asset. Since trading costs are a proxy for the informed traders
capacity to buy and sell stock, we can establish testable implication on the relationship between
insiders trading activities and return distributions. More speciﬁcally the model predicts that the
skewness of the return must increase with insiders purchases (decrease with k+) and decrease with
insiders sales (increase with k−). The eﬀect on the variance of the returns depends on which of the
two opposing eﬀects described above dominates. When the liquidity provision eﬀect dominates (or
when the adverse selection eﬀect is weak), both insiders sales and purchases reduce the variance of
the return. We now turn to our empirical study where these hypothesis are tested. In our empirical
exercise we test these hypothesis separately and in combination with the hypothesis put forward
in Hong et al. (2005) that relates stock repurchases by ﬁrms to the volatility and the skewness of
returns.


















































































Figure 4: Eﬀects of informed’s trading costs on the price variance and skewness due to liquidity shocks.
The graphs show variations of the base case parametrization that is σ2
x = 1, σ2
s = 0.01, σ2
ε = 0.01, rI = 2,
rU = 1, λ = 0.1, and k− = k+ = 0.05. The informeds’ signal s is ﬁxed to be 0. The two graphs at the top
display the variance of P1 and P2 as a function of the informed trading costs (keeping k− and k+ equal).
The two graphs at the bottom display the skewness of P1 and P2 as a function of k−, when k+ is kept
constant and equal to 0.05.
153 Empirical analysis
The main objective of the empirical analysis is to asses whether insider trading aﬀect returns
distribution. In particular, we focus on its impact on the short-horizon volatility and the skewness
of stock returns. We also compare the results for insider trading with those obtained for the case of
share repurchases. We start describing the dataset and deﬁning all variables involved in our study.
3.1 Description of the data
Using data from CRSP, COMPUSTAT and Thompson Financial Insider Trading Dataset (TFIT)
from January 1986 to December 2003, we construct the variables deﬁned below for each non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrm and year pair. The construction of most variables follows Hong et al. (2005), who
provide further details on the dataset construction process, and whose notation we follow.6.
3.1.1 Insider trading variables
We consider as insiders all the traders that are deﬁned as such by the Section 16(a) of the Se-
curity and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA), by which large beneﬁcial shareholders and managers of
a publicly traded ﬁrm are required to ﬁle their transactions in the company stock with the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This deﬁnition includes the managers of publicly traded
companies, in particular the chairman, directors, CEOs, CFOs, oﬃcers, presidents, vice presidents,
aﬃliates, members of committees, etc, and large shareholders. Our deﬁnition of insiders does not
include other people that might posses non-public information about the company, but that are
not considered insiders under the Section 16(a) of the Security and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA).
From this deﬁnition, it is clear that any information advantage that is given to ﬁrms is also an
information advantage of insiders.
We deﬁne IPURi,t as the value of all the shares purchased by insiders of ﬁrm i during year
t divided by the average daily market capitalization of ﬁrm i during year t. Similarly, we deﬁne
ISALi,t as the value of all the shares sold by insiders of ﬁrm i during year t divided by the average
market capitalization of ﬁrm i during year t.
6The only variables that are not deﬁned in Hong et al. (2005) are those related to insider trading activity, IPURi,t
and ISALi,t, and the measures of return variance using one year of data, DVARYi,t and MVARYi,t.
163.1.2 Measures of return variance and skewness
The measures of return variance and skewness that we construct are those used by Hong et al.
(2005). To compute these variables, we use continuously compounded returns.
The measures of return variance are TVARi,t, which is the variance of the two non overlapping
three years returns of ﬁrm i using data from year t to t + 5; AVARi,t, which is the variance of
the six non overlapping one year returns of ﬁrm i using data from year t to t + 5; and SVARi,t,
QVARi,t, MVARi,t, WVARi,t, and DVARi,t, which are constructed as AVARi,t, but using semian-
nual, quarterly, monthly, weekly and daily returns, respectively. All these measures of variance are
annualized.
Apart from the previous variables, we also have constructed measures of variance using only
data corresponding to year t. We call them DVARYi,t and MVARYi,t, and they are build as DVARi,t
and MVARi,t, but instead of using data from year t to year t + 5 we only data corresponding to
year t.
For each ﬁrm and year, we also compute the skewness of quarterly, monthly, weekly, and daily
returns of ﬁrm i during year t, denoted by QSKEWi,t, MSKEWi,t, WSKEWi,t, and DSKEWi,t,
respectively.
3.1.3 Other variables
We use the four measures of ﬁnancial constrainedness employed by Hong et al. (2005). The ﬁrst is
the value of common shares repurchased by ﬁrm i during year t adjusted by the ﬁrm’s net income,
this variable is denoted REPURCHASESi,t. It is computed as the purchased common and preferred
stock (COMPUSTAT annual 115) minus the reduction in the preferred stock liquidation value (the
reduction in the annual data item 10), divided by net income (172). The second is the ﬁrm’s age
AGEi,t, computed as the number of years from the ﬁrst appearance in CRSP. Finally, the last two
are the Kaplan-Zingales index, KZi,t, and a reduced version of this index that does not include
17neither book leverage nor Tobin’s Q, this latter variable, KZ3i,t. KZ and KZ3 are computed as:









+ 3.139Leveragei,t + 0.283Qi,t.










Note that KZ and KZ3 are increasing with ﬁnancial constrainedness.
The other variables in our study, all deﬁned for each ﬁrm i during year t, are the logarithm of
ﬁrm’s average daily market capitalization, LOGSIZEi,t, its market leverage, MLEVi,t, the logarithm
of the market to book ratio, LOGMBi,t, the average monthly return, RETi,t, and the average
daily turnover, TURNOVERi,t. Finally, INDUSTRYDUMMIESi,t is a set of dummies for the 48
industries in Fama and French (1997).7
3.1.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 contains the time series average of cross-sectional means and standard deviations for the
variables that we have previously deﬁned. These summary statistics are similar to those in previous
studies, for instance Lakonishok and Lee (2001) or Mar´ ın and Olivier (2006) for insider trading
activity, and Hong et al. (2005) for the other variables.
Insiders are, on average, net sellers of stock. This suggests that the cost of purchasing shares
is larger than the cost of selling them, k+ > k− in our model. However, we must take into account
that most of insiders sales could be motivated for diversiﬁcation purposes and not for misvaluation
opportunities.
As Hong et al. (2005), we ﬁnd that the short term variances are larger than the long term
variances, which implies a negative autocorrelation in stock returns. Furthermore, skewness is
positive for short horizons and decreases with the time interval, becoming negative for quarterly
returns.
7The measures of insider trading activity, variance, skewness, stock repurchases and the components of the Kaplan-
Zingales indexes are winsorized to mitigate the impact of anomalous or extreme observations. Insider trades have
been cross-checked with CRSP data to eliminate problematic records as in Lakonishok and Lee (2001). We have
excluded from our sample the ﬁrms for which we do not have any insider trade in the whole sample period.



























19The times series average of the cross-sectional correlations between the measures of ﬁnancial
constrainedness and insider trading activity are reported in Table 2. This table shows that insider
trading activity is larger in younger ﬁrms, and that insiders tend to purchase shares of ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms; hence, when ﬁrms have diﬃculties in providing price support, insiders might
provide it. This intimates that insiders’ purchases and ﬁrms’ repurchases might be substitutes in
providing price support. Note that insider sales are more negatively correlated with KZ than KZ3,
this suggests that insiders tend to sell less in ﬁrms with high investment opportunities, measured
by Tobin’s Q.
Table 2: Time series average of cross-sectional correlations between ﬁnancial constraintness measures and
insider trading activity. Data from 1986-2003
REPURCHASE AGE KZ KZ3 IPUR ISAL
REPURCHASE 1
AGE .08478125 1
KZ -.07308364 -.11764388 1
KZ3 -.06999179 -.21181013 .73401205 1
IPUR -.01442049 -.05959318 .02933922 .05206674 1
ISAL -.01909647 -.14802733 -.03124193 -.01639203 .02590551 1
3.2 Eﬀects of IT on returns’ distribution
In this section we examine the eﬀects of insider trading on the short-horizon variance and skewness
of stock returns.
3.2.1 Eﬀects of IT on short term variance
We ﬁrst estimate the eﬀect of insider trading and ﬁnancial constrainedness on the short-horizon
return variance, controlling for long-horizon return variance, TVAR, and other variables that have
been found relevant in previous studies, following the Hong et al. (2005) setup. In particular, we
20estimate the model:
STVARi,t = β1 CONSTRAINTi,t−1 + β2 IPURi,t−1 + β3 ISALi,t−1 + β4 TVARi,t
+ β5 LOGSIZEi,t−1 + β6 MLEVi,t−1 + β7 LOGMBi,t−1 + β8 RETi,t−1
+ β9 TURNOVERi,t−1 + INDUSTRYDUMMIESi,t−1 ∆ + i,t ,
for i = 1...N .
(3.1)
In the estimation of model (3.1) we use the Fama-MacBeth type regressions (Fama and MacBeth
(1973)) correcting for autocorrelation using Newey-West standard errors (Newey and West (1987)).
The measures of short-horizon variance, denoted as STVAR in (3.1), are DVAR (daily), WVAR
(weekly), MVAR (monthly), QVAR (quarterly), SVAR (semiannual), and AVAR (annual). Recall
that all these measures of variance are computed with non overlapping time periods using data
from year t to t+5. The measures of ﬁnancial constrainedness, denoted by CONSTRAINT in 3.1,
are stock repurchases (REPURCHASES), ﬁrm’s age (AGE), and the two Kaplan-Zingales indexes
(KZ and KZ3). The estimation results are reported in Table 3. Note that each column of the table
corresponds to a diﬀerent measure of ﬁnancial constrainedness and that the last column does not
include any of the previous measures as an explanatory variable.
Insider sales and purchases, when signiﬁcant, have a negative sign predicting short-horizon
variance, which is what we expected according to our model if adverse selection is low. When the
measure of short-horizon variance is computed using daily returns, both insider sales and purchases
are signiﬁcant and negative. An increase of two standard deviations in insider purchases and sales
leads to a decrease of 0.01587 and 0.01291 in daily variance, respectively, or 3.13% and 2.55%
of the cross-sectional variance in DVAR; note that an increase of two standard deviations in ﬁrm
repurchases leads to a decrease of 4.03% of the cross-sectional variance in DVAR. For longer horizon
variances, insider purchases tend to be signiﬁcant, but not insider sales. Note that insider might
sell shares for a variety of reasons, but it is reasonable to think that they only will purchase shares
when the market price is below the fundamental price according to insider’s valuation. Insider
transactions have an impact on shorter-horizon variances (DVAR or WVAR), but not on longer-
horizon variances. Table 3 is consistent with Hong et al.’s ﬁndings regarding the role of ﬁrms being
buyers of last resort.
21Table 3: Fama-MacBeth regressions of short-horizon return variance on insider trading activity. Variance
measueres are computed using 5 years of data. Newey-West corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
CONSTRAINT: REPURCHASE AGE KZ KZ3
Dependent variable is DVARi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 –0.022** 0.000* 0.035** 0.036**
(–4.947) (2.333) (10.719) (11.907)
IPURi,t−1 –0.970 –1.242+ –1.343 –1.363+ –1.229+
(–1.266) (–1.733) (–1.628) (–1.655) (–1.727)
ISALi,t−1 –0.421+ –0.341+ –0.322 –0.335 –0.356*
(–1.813) (–1.888) (–1.375) (–1.441) (–1.977)
Dependent variable is WVARi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 –0.019** –0.000 0.028** 0.030**
(–6.180) (–1.097) (20.805) (18.002)
IPURi,t−1 –0.457 –0.592+ –0.578 –0.593 –0.573+
(–1.398) (–1.732) (–1.485) (–1.520) (–1.658)
ISALi,t−1 0.009 0.004 0.052 0.039 0.012
(0.051) (0.034) (0.317) (0.237) (0.103)
Dependent variable is MVARi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 –0.017** –0.000 0.026** 0.028**
(–5.541) (–1.301) (13.450) (12.039)
IPURi,t−1 –0.032 –0.082 –0.116 –0.130 –0.061
(–0.092) (–0.263) (–0.314) (–0.349) (–0.191)
ISALi,t−1 0.037 0.014 0.093 0.082 0.025
(0.297) (0.168) (0.737) (0.655) (0.306)
Dependent variable is QVARi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 –0.017** –0.000+ 0.024** 0.027**
(–5.678) (–1.930) (12.120) (11.178)
IPURi,t−1 –0.325 –0.450+ –0.449 –0.463 –0.430+
(–1.171) (–1.839) (–1.416) (–1.445) (–1.719)
ISALi,t−1 0.046 0.002 0.080 0.068 0.022
(0.707) (0.047) (1.552) (1.328) (0.421)
Dependent variable is SVARi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 –0.018** –0.000+ 0.023** 0.025**
(–4.669) (–1.841) (14.137) (12.326)
IPURi,t−1 –0.340 –0.446 –0.424 –0.439 –0.428
(–1.028) (–1.580) (–1.220) (–1.252) (–1.485)
ISALi,t−1 0.027 –0.041 0.063 0.053 –0.025
(0.434) (–0.517) (1.030) (0.871) (–0.317)
Dependent variable is AVARi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 –0.015** –0.001* 0.024** 0.026**
(–3.758) (–2.327) (12.913) (14.936)
IPURi,t−1 –0.147 –0.082 –0.100 –0.114 –0.061
(–0.343) (–0.314) (–0.273) (–0.309) (–0.228)
ISALi,t−1 –0.049 –0.133 0.028 0.015 –0.109
(–0.405) (–0.962) (0.223) (0.120) (–0.771)
+ signiﬁcant at 10% level, * signiﬁcant at 5% level, ** signiﬁcant at 1% level
22In model (3.1), return variances are computed using 6 years of data. It is likely that in this long
time period ﬁrm’s executive compensation schemes and the board consideration of insider trading
activity might change. this would aﬀect insider trading behavior and, consequently, our empirical
results. For this reason, we construct measures of daily return variance using only one year of
data, DVARY, and a variable capturing monthly returns variance, MVARY, as the longer horizon
returns measure, using also one year of data. Furthermore, instead of using lagged insider trading
activity, we will use the current one, but instrumented by lagged trading and other variables that
might aﬀect insider trading activity. We have chosen the instrumental variables approach because
of the endogeneity of insider trading activity. The instruments, apart from lagged insider sales and
purchases, include lagged measures of return variance, the average monthly stock returns in the
previous two years, the logarithm of the ﬁrm’s lagged market capitalization, the logarithm of its
lagged market to book ration, the lagged average daily turnover and ﬁrm’s age. The speciﬁcation
of this model is
DVARYi,t = β1 CONSTRAINTi,t−1 + β2 \ IPURi,t + β3 [ ISALi,t + β4 MVARYi,t
+ β5 LOGSIZEi,t−1 + β6 MLEVi,t−1 + β7 LOGMBi,t−1 + β8 RETi,t−1
+ β9 TURNOVERi,t−1 + INDUSTRYDUMMIESi,t−1 ∆ + i,t ,
IPURi,t = γ0 + γ1 IPURi,t−1 + γ2 ISALi,t−1 + γ3 DVARYi,t−1 + γ4 MVARYi,t−1
+ γ5 RETi,t−1 + γ6 RETi,t−2 + γ7 LOGSIZEi,t−1 + γ8 LOGMBi,t−1
+ γ9 AGEi,t−1 + γ10 TURNOVERi,t−1 + ˜ i,t ,
ISALi,t = δ0 + δ1 IPURi,t−1 + δ2 ISALi,t−1 + δ3 DVARYi,t−1 + δ4 MVARYi,t−1
+ δ5 RETi,t−1 + δ6 RETi,t−2 + δ7 LOGSIZEi,t−1 + δ8 LOGMBi,t−1
+ δ9 AGEi,t−1 + δ10 TURNOVERi,t−1 + ˜ ˜ i,t ,
for i = 1...N .
(3.2)
which we estimate using Fama-Macbeth approach correcting for autocorrelation using Newey-
West standard errors.
Table 4 reports the estimated coeﬃcients for the ﬁnancial constrainedness measures and in-
23Table 4: Fama-MacBeth IV regressions of short-horizon return variance on insider trading activity. The
measure of short-horizon variance is daily returns variance, DVARY, and we control for monthly returns
variance, MVARY; both measures are computed using one year of data. Newey-West corrected t-statistics
in parentheses.
CONSTRAINT: REPURCHASE AGE KZ KZ3
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 –0.012** –0.000 0.000 –0.000
(–2.776) (–0.306) (0.094) (–0.038)
\ IPURi,t−1 –5.386 –7.017+ –7.121+ –7.112+ –7.075+
(–1.313) (–1.903) (–1.862) (–1.858) (–1.959)
[ ISALi,t−1 –6.292* –5.660+ –5.471+ –5.483+ –5.284+
(–1.970) (–1.809) (–1.688) (–1.688) (–1.671)
+ signiﬁcant at 10% level, * signiﬁcant at 5% level, ** signiﬁcant at 1% level
sider trading activity of model 3.2. In this setup, insider purchases and sales are signiﬁcant and
both reduce the short-horizon variance. Insider purchases fail to be signiﬁcant when lagged ﬁrm
repurchases are included in the regressions, and this latter variable is the only measure of ﬁnancial
constrainedness that is signiﬁcant in this setup.
3.2.2 Eﬀects of IT on skewness
The second prediction of our model is that the ability of insiders to purchase shares increases
the skewness of short-horizon returns and that the ability of insiders to sell decreases it. These
predictions are tested using the following speciﬁcation, similar to 3.1:
SKEWi,t = β1 CONSTRAINTi,t−1 + β2 IPURi,t−1 + β3 ISALi,t−1
+ β5 LOGSIZEi,t−1 + β6 MLEVi,t−1 + β7 LOGMBi,t−1 + β8 RETi,t−1
+ β9 TURNOVERi,t−1 + INDUSTRYDUMMIESi,t−1 ∆ + i,t ,
for i = 1...N,
(3.3)
The dependent variable measuring skewness of stock returns, denoted by SKEW in (3.3), is
computed using daily data (DSKEW), weekly (WSKEW), monthly (MSKWE), and quarterly
(QSKEW). The measures of ﬁnancial constrainedness, denoted by CONSTRAINT, are the same
24as in the previous section: stock repurchases (REPURCHASES), ﬁrm’s age (AGE), and the two
Kaplan-Zingales indexes (KZ and KZ3).
In table 5 we report the results of estimating (3.3) using the Fama-Macbeth approach correcting
for autocorrelation using Newey-West standard errors. The sign of the coeﬃcient for insider pur-
chases is always positive, and always negative for insider sales; this is consistent with the predictions
of our model. However, insider purchases tend to be non-signiﬁcant, but for the case in which the
dependent variable is QSKEW. The only measure of ﬁnancial constrainedness that is signiﬁcant for
all measures of skewness is AGE, but all are signiﬁcant predicting QSEW. Note that, as in model
(3.1), lagged insider trading activity might not be a good proxy for the ability of insiders to trade.
Similarly to (3.2), we have also instrumented insider trading activity by lagged insider sales
and purchases, lagged measures of return variance, the stock returns in the two previous years, the
logarithm of the ﬁrm’s lagged market capitalization, the logarithm of its lagged market to book
ration, the lagged average daily turnover and ﬁrm’s age. The speciﬁcation of the IV model is similar
to (3.2):
SKEWi,t = β1 CONSTRAINTi,t−1 + β2 \ IPURi,t + β3 [ ISALi,t
+ β5 LOGSIZEi,t−1 + β6 MLEVi,t−1 + β7 LOGMBi,t−1 + β8 RETi,t−1
+ β9 TURNOVERi,t−1 + INDUSTRYDUMMIESi,t−1 ∆ + i,t ,
IPURi,t = γ0 + γ1 IPURi,t−1 + γ2 ISALi,t−1
+ γ3 RETi,t−1 + γ4 RETi,t−2 + γ5 LOGSIZEi,t−1 + γ6 LOGMBi,t−1
+ γ7 AGEi,t−1 + γ8 TURNOVERi,t−1 + ˜ i,t ,
ISALi,t = δ0 + δ1 IPURi,t−1 + δ2 ISALi,t−1
+ δ3 RETi,t−1 + δ4 RETi,t−2 + δ5 LOGSIZEi,t−1 + δ6 LOGMBi,t−1
+ δ7 AGEi,t−1 + δ8 TURNOVERi,t−1 + ˜ ˜ i,t ,
for i = 1...N,
(3.4)
and the model is estimated using Fama-MacBeth approach correcting for autocorrelation using
Newey-West standard errors.
25Table 5: Fama-MacBeth regressions of returns skewness on insider trading activity. Newey-West corrected
t-statistics in parentheses.
CONSTRAINT: REPURCHASE AGE KZ KZ3
Dependent variable is DSKEWi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 0.019 0.005** 0.009 0.002
(1.512) (8.766) (1.375) (0.262)
IPURi,t−1 1.247 1.542 1.731+ 1.726+ 1.501
(1.023) (1.641) (1.719) (1.712) (1.616)
ISALi,t−1 –1.809** –1.510** –1.591** –1.601** –1.724**
(–7.531) (–7.130) (–6.789) (–6.958) (–8.161)
Dependent variable is WSKEWi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 0.014 0.003** 0.004 –0.003
(1.101) (7.756) (0.678) (–0.376)
IPURi,t−1 0.512 0.646 0.830 0.839 0.603
(0.559) (0.865) (0.925) (0.934) (0.792)
ISALi,t−1 –1.344** –1.146** –1.213** –1.219** –1.303**
(–6.515) (–6.938) (–6.470) (–6.518) (–7.587)
Dependent variable is MSKEWi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 0.015* 0.002** 0.003 –0.005
(2.514) (4.661) (0.498) (–0.903)
IPURi,t−1 0.183 0.501 0.667 0.671 0.462
(0.226) (0.828) (0.837) (0.840) (0.754)
ISALi,t−1 –0.912** –0.871** –1.004** –1.007** –0.981**
(–2.862) (–3.206) (–3.503) (–3.531) (–3.518)
Dependent variable is QSKEWi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 0.016+ 0.001* –0.014* –0.017**
(1.688) (2.464) (–2.166) (–2.858)
IPURi,t−1 1.241* 0.814 1.174+ 1.183+ 0.799
(2.291) (1.612) (1.925) (1.952) (1.558)
ISALi,t−1 –0.280 –0.189 –0.303 –0.296 –0.244
(–1.023) (–0.703) (–1.104) (–1.090) (–0.868)
+ signiﬁcant at 10% level, * signiﬁcant at 5% level, ** signiﬁcant at 1% level
26Table 6 reports the results obtained in the estimation of (3.4). Insider purchases increase the
skewness and insider sales decrease it, consistently with our model. Insider purchases are signiﬁcant
when the dependent variable is daily or quarterly skewness; insider sales are always signiﬁcant, but
for the case of quarterly skewness. Insider transactions have a larger impact on shorter-horizon
skewness (DSKEW) than on longer-horizon skewness. Note that the only measure of ﬁnancial
constrainedness that is signiﬁcant in all the regressions is ﬁrm’s age, share repurchases is signiﬁcant
when the dependent variable is monthly skewness, and the Kaplan-Zingales indexes when the
dependent variable is quarterly skewness. In Table 6, the evidence in favor of ﬁrms being buyers
of last resort is weaker than in Tables 3 and 4, but stronger in favor of insiders being liquidity
providers.
4 Conclusions and further research
When liquidity shocks move asset prices away from fundamental values, corporate insiders are in
a privileged position to absorb this demand for liquidity. In order to provide liquidity, insiders can
trade on the ﬁrm’s account, through buy back programs or seasonal equity oﬀerings, or on their
own account. In this paper we provide a theoretical framework and evidence supporting the role of
corporate insiders as liquidity providers which complements the evidence provided in Hong et al.
(2005) on ﬁrms playing a similar role. We identify some diﬀerences though in the way these two type
of traders provide liquidity. First, while stock repurchases clearly reduce return volatility, insiders
transactions may not. This is because, unlike ﬁrms, insiders face an adverse selection problem
when trading. When the adverse selection eﬀect is stronger than the price support eﬀect, volatility
may increase. This explains why our results on volatility are weaker than those linking volatility to
stock repurchases. On the other hand insider trading plays a more clear role in generating skewness
in returns than stock repurchases, specially in the short run.
Our ﬁndings are relevant in understanding the liquidity provision process and might enlighten
policy makers on the implications of insider trading restrictions, disclosure requirements, and in-
sider transactions publicity on the liquidity of stock markets. Moreover, the impact of insider
trading on liquidity, short-horizon variance and skewness is relevant for risk management and asset
pricing. Firms that restrict insider trading activity might have less liquid and more volatile stocks.
27Table 6: Fama-MacBeth IV regressions of returns skewness on insider trading activity. Newey-West corrected
t-statistics in parentheses.
CONSTRAINT: REPURCHASE AGE KZ KZ3
Dependent variable is DSKEWi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 0.019 0.004** 0.010 0.004
(1.549) (6.714) (1.446) (0.513)
\ IPURi,t−1 6.509 6.556+ 7.724* 7.700* 7.992*
(1.520) (1.736) (2.086) (2.080) (2.157)
[ ISALi,t−1 –10.098** –5.780** –9.056** –9.024** –9.719**
(–12.075) (–5.272) (–8.699) (–8.932) (–7.632)
Dependent variable is WSKEWi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 0.015 0.003** 0.005 –0.000
(1.129) (8.051) (0.852) (–0.044)
\ IPURi,t−1 3.525 3.540 4.162 4.183 4.671
(1.119) (1.218) (1.323) (1.331) (1.521)
[ ISALi,t−1 –6.849** –3.858** –6.192** –6.159** –6.682**
(–9.418) (–5.122) (–6.813) (–6.808) (–6.691)
Dependent variable is MSKEWi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 0.015* 0.002** 0.003 –0.004
(2.464) (3.976) (0.604) (–0.664)
\ IPURi,t−1 3.131 3.777 3.985 3.983 4.461
(0.952) (1.290) (1.255) (1.256) (1.441)
[ ISALi,t−1 –5.232** –2.905* –5.453** –5.401** –5.288**
(–3.088) (–2.184) (–3.533) (–3.532) (–3.430)
Dependent variable is QSKEWi,t
CONSTRAINTi,t−1 0.015 0.001* –0.014* –0.017**
(1.519) (2.324) (–2.478) (–3.222)
\ IPURi,t 4.879* 4.474* 4.720* 4.735* 4.875*
(2.410) (2.110) (2.071) (2.095) (2.242)
[ ISALi,t –0.842 –0.039 –1.033 –0.980 –0.984
(–0.687) (–0.038) (–0.836) (–0.789) (–0.888)
+ signiﬁcant at 10% level, * signiﬁcant at 5% level, ** signiﬁcant at 1% level
28Furthermore, the inability to provide price support on the ﬁrm’s account makes ﬁnancially con-
strained ﬁrms riskier. Finally, the presence of lockup periods, in which insiders cannot sell their
holdings, can make stock prices more prone to temporal overpricing.
At the current state of our research agenda, two important questions remain that will be ad-
dressed in further work. The ﬁrst is to improve our understanding of liquidity provision by insiders
by focusing on large price corrections due to liquidity shocks. In this event-study type setting we
will be in a better position to asses insiders actions and their impact on return distributions. The
second is analyzing the eﬀect of earlier disclosure of insider trades, as imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley
Act after August of 2002. Furthermore, our results call for the need to develop a full theory that
analyzes the tradeoﬀs involved in insiders’ decision to trade on the ﬁrm’s vs their own account, in
the presence of liquidity shocks, when both moral hazard and adverse selection considerations are
in place. All these extensions, however, are beyond the scope of the present paper.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of lemma 1















31it is immediate that the ﬁrst order conditions derived from this optimization problem imply that
the optimal informed demand is
x∗
I,1 =












I,1 6= 0 because the cost k is not diﬀerentiable at 0.
Note that a suﬃcient condition to to have x∗
I,1 > 0 is s > P1+k+; similarly, a suﬃcient condition
to to have x∗
I,1 > 0 is s < P1 − k−. Therefore, the optimal demand of an informed trader at t = 1







ε if s < P1 − k−,
s−P1−k+
rI σ2
ε if s > P1 + k+.
We will show now that whenever P1−k− ≤ s ≤ P1+k+ the optimal demand for the informed is
xI,1 = 0. Let us assume that the optimal demand is xI,1 > 0, in this case we know that xI,1 = x∗
I,1,
but given that s ≤ P1 + k+ we would have xI,1 = x∗
I,1 ≤ 0, which contradicts that xI,1 > 0. In the
same way, we can show that it can’t be optimal xI,1 < 0 when s ≥ P1 −k−. As a consequence, the
optimal demand for the informed is xI,1 = 0 whenever P1 − k− ≤ s ≤ P1 + k+.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
At t = 2 the uninformed already knows the informed trade at t = 1, and being public information
we can consider the cases in which the informed trade, xI,1 6= 0, and the case in which the informed
do not trade, xI,1 = 0, separately. Let us solve ﬁrs the equilibrium in the former case and second
in the later.
Informed trade at t = 1
Given that the uninformed knows that xI,1 6= 0 and that, in this case, xI,1 =
s−P1+k−
rI σ2
ε by lemma 1.
It is clear that knowing the actual value of xI,1 6= 0 and P1 is informationally equivalent to know






Imposing the market clearing condition, λxI,2 +(1−λ)xU,2 = x and the fact that informed agents
cannot trade at t = 2, xI,2 = xI,1, it is immediate that






















































if s > P1 + k+.
Informed do not trade at t = 1
In this case, uninformed know P1 and xI,1 = 0, which implies they know x and that P1 −k− ≤ s ≤
P1 + k+. We will deﬁne s0 = s
σs, s =
P1−k−
σs , and s =
P1+k+
σs . Uninformed maximize the expected
utility of their wealth conditional on their information at t = 2, this expected utility can be written
33as follows:



























































































where φ and Φ are the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function of a
standard normal random variable. Substituting φ(s0) = 1 √
2π exp(−s02






2 ) outside the integral , we can rewrite the expected utility as follows:











































































(s0 + rU xU,2 σs)2
ds0.
34With the change of variables z = s0 + rU xU,2 σs,







































Note that maximizing E[ UU (WU,3) | IU,2 ] is equivalent to minimize
ln
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thus, the ﬁrst order conditions for the uninformed are
σs
φ(s + rU xU,2 σs) − φ(s + rU xU,2 σs)
Φ(s + rU xU,2 σs) − Φ(s + rU xU,2 σs)
+ P2 + rU xU,2 (σ2
ε + σ2
s) = 0.
The market clearing condition, (1 − λ)xU,2 + x = 0 imposes that xU,2 = −x
1−λ and substituting








φ(s − rU σs x
1−λ ) − φ(s − rU σs x
1−λ )
Φ(s − rU σs x










σs − rU σs x
1−λ ) − φ(
P1−k−




σs − rU σs x
1−λ ) − Φ(
P1−k−
σs − rU σs x
1−λ )
.
A.3 Numerical approximation to the equilibrium at t = 1
The numerical approximation to the equilibrium is based on the projection method used by Bernardo
and Judd (2000), as a consequence we are estimating an ε-rational expectations equilibrium8. In
an ε-rational expectations equilibrium, for all states in a set of probability 1 − ε, the decisions of
8We shall not confuse the ε in the deﬁnition of ε-rational expectations equilibrium with the random variable ε in
our model.
35all traders are nearly optimal, with the absolute value of their relative error not larger than ε; and
markets almost clear, with the absolute value of the excess demand not larger than ε.
The equilibrium price, P1(x,s), and uninformed demand, xU(P1), are approximated by ﬁnite-
order polynomials, which transforms our problem of computing the equilibrium in an inﬁnite dimen-
sional space into estimating a ﬁnite number of parameters. In particular we deﬁne the approximated











where Hi is the degree i Hermite polynomial and N is the largest degree of the polynomial ap-
proximation. In our case, we have obtained the best results for N = 3. The choice of Hermite
polynomials is because they are mutually orthogonal with respect to the normal density function
with mean zero, the advantages of such a base of polynomials are discussed in Judd (1992). Our
goal is to estimate the parameters ai,j and bi and, to do so, we will impose several conditions derived
from the uninformed ﬁrst order condition and market clearing.
Following Bernardo and Judd (2000) methodology, we numerically impose the conditional ex-
pectation ﬁrst order condition
E

rU (s + ε − P1)exp
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as the (N + 1) expectation conditions
E

rU (s + ε − P1)exp
 






= 0, for i = 0...N;














= 0, for i + j = 0...N.
36The expectations are computed using Gaussian quadrature, whose nodes and weights are ob-
tained from the routine qnwnorm, that belongs to COMPECON toolbox, written to accompany Miranda
and Fackler (2002). We use 9 Gauss nodes to compute the quadrature, we observe that increasing
the number of points does not improve the estimation. Finally, to solve the resulting nonlinear
system we use the trust-region dogleg algorithm as implemented in fsolve function from Matlab’s
optimization toolbox.
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